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JUDICIAL REVIEW IN EXPEDITED
REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS: APPLYING SIMS
V. APFEL TO ASSESS THE ROLE OF ISSUE
EXHAUSTION
Emily Carden Snow*
For noncitizens in expedited removal proceedings, obtaining
judicial review of removal orders is an uphill battle. Some
barriers to judicial review are statutory: noncitizens must first
exhaust their administrative remedies, and they may seek
review only in a federal circuit court of appeals. Other barriers
are judicial—i.e., imposed by courts, not statutes.
A circuit split has emerged over one of these judicially
imposed barriers to judicial review. Some courts have held that
expedited removal proceedings do not accommodate legal
challenges to removal. In those circuits, noncitizens preserve the
opportunity for judicial review even when they do not raise a
legal challenge during those proceedings. Other courts have
held that noncitizens must contest the legal grounds for their
removal during expedited removal proceedings. This circuit
split has fragmented the judicial review process for expedited
removal orders, with detrimental effect.
In Sims v. Apfel, the U.S. Supreme Court provided a
framework for assessing the propriety of a judicially imposed
issue-exhaustion requirement. Central to the Court’s analysis
was the degree to which administrative proceedings are
inquisitorial rather than adversarial. But expedited removal
proceedings are neither inquisitorial nor adversarial, and they
offer far fewer procedural protections than full removal
proceedings. This Note argues that, under Sims, requiring issue
exhaustion is inappropriate in appeals from expedited removal
proceedings. In the absence of a statutory mandate, circuit
courts should not construct an additional barrier to judicial
review by imposing an issue-exhaustion requirement.
*

J.D. Candidate, 2021, University of Georgia School of Law; M.Sc., 2014, London School of
Economics and Political Science; B.A., 2013, Wake Forest University. This Note is dedicated
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I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose a noncitizen, who has been convicted of a crime, is
placed in expedited removal proceedings. Their crime was not
violent, but under the governing immigration law, it is considered
an “aggravated felony.” After moving through the administrative
process and receiving a final removal order, the noncitizen wishes
to contest, in a federal circuit court of appeals, the legal question
that their conviction was an aggravated felony. Can that circuit
court review the agency’s decision, or has the noncitizen failed to
exhaust their administrative remedies by not raising this legal issue
during the expedited removal proceedings?
Over the past few decades, legislation in the United States has
increasingly narrowed the scope of judicial review over immigration
proceedings.1 One practice, in particular, has advanced this trend:
the administrative-exhaustion requirement. The obligation to
exhaust administrative remedies before appealing a matter to the
federal courts is a core tenet of administrative law.2 The
administrative-exhaustion requirement is neither new3 nor without
justification: it serves important purposes of “protecting
administrative agency authority and promoting judicial efficiency.”4
The requirement of exhausting administrative remedies takes on
particular significance in the context of immigration law. One
See infra Part II.A.
See, e.g., McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144–45 (1992) (“This Court long has
acknowledged the general rule that parties exhaust prescribed administrative remedies
before seeking relief from the federal courts.”), superseded by statute, Prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66, as recognized in Woodford v. Ngo,
548 U.S. 81, 84–85 (2006) (explaining that the Prison Litigation Reform Act “strengthened
[the] exhaustion provision” in response to a flood of prisoner litigation in federal courts).
3 See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50–51 (1938) (explaining “the
long settled rule of judicial administration that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a
supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been
exhausted”).
4 Jon C. Dubin, Torquemada Meets Kafka: The Misapplication of the Issue Exhaustion
Doctrine to Inquisitorial Administrative Proceedings, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1289, 1307 (1997);
see also Toni M. Fine, Appellate Practice on Review of Agency Action: A Guide for
Practitioners, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 8 (1996) (noting that the exhaustion requirement furthers
several policies, including “the desire to permit the agency to perform its functions using its
special expertise and competence,” the ability of agencies to correct mistakes without court
intervention, and the fostering of “respect for the integrity of the administrative process”).
1
2

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2020

3

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 55, No. 2 [2020], Art. 7

850

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:847

reason is that the space for judicial review of removal orders is
already slim, so any additional barrier to obtaining judicial
review—even one as routine as the exhaustion of administrative
remedies—looms large.5 Another reason is that the circuit courts
disagree on the standard for noncitizens to exhaust administrative
remedies before seeking judicial review of a removal order.6 This
circuit split means that some appellate courts will exercise judicial
review over a removal order even when a noncitizen did not raise a
legal challenge to their removal during the administrative
proceedings below, while other courts will decline to exercise review
because they believe that their jurisdiction is improper.7 Yet
similarly situated noncitizens, distinguished only by the circuit
court before which they happen to appear, should be entitled to the
same measure of judicial review.
This Note considers a narrow category of individuals facing
removal from the United States: noncitizens who are not lawful
permanent residents and who have been convicted of a crime
deemed to be an “aggravated felony” under the Immigration and
Nationality Act (the INA).8 This specific category, because of these
noncitizens’ legal status, faces “expedited removal.”9 As the name
suggests, expedited removal is an accelerated process managed by
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in which noncitizens
are denied the standard hearings and procedural protections that
other noncitizens usually receive—including those who are
similarly convicted of aggravated felonies.10 This Note further
5 See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts:
Immigration and Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1615–16 (2000) (observing the
“tormented relationship between immigration and judicial review” and noting phenomena,
including “court-stripping legislation,” that evince “a clear though qualified pattern of
genuine discomfort—on the parts of both Congress and the judiciary—with the notion of a
significant judicial role in immigration matters”).
6 See infra Part II.C.
7 See infra notes 12–15 and accompanying text.
8 See generally Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2018); see also id.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (“Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after
admission is deportable.”); id. § 1101(a)(43) (defining “aggravated felony”).
9 Id. § 1228(b) (authorizing an expedited removal process for noncitizens convicted of
aggravated felonies and who are “not lawfully admitted for permanent residence” to the
United States).
10 See Etienne v. Lynch, 813 F.3d 135, 138–39 (4th Cir. 2015) (discussing the procedural
distinctions accompanying removal of noncitizens charged with removability for an
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considers noncitizens facing expedited removal who wish to
challenge the classification of their conviction as an “aggravated
felony” before a federal circuit court, despite their failure to raise
this issue during the initial expedited removal proceedings.
The federal circuit courts diverge on whether the expedited
removal procedure affords noncitizens the opportunity to contest
the legal basis for their removal, or whether it accommodates
factual challenges alone.11 Some circuits have held that the
administrative process that precedes expedited removal does not
afford noncitizens an opportunity to challenge the legal grounds of
their removal.12 As a result, noncitizens who do not—or cannot—
challenge the legal basis for their removal during these
administrative proceedings have not failed to exhaust
administrative remedies and thus have not lost the opportunity for
judicial review.13 Other circuits, in contrast, have held that
noncitizens do have the opportunity to raise legal challenges during
expedited removal proceedings.14 For those circuits, not raising a
legal challenge to removability constitutes a failure to exhaust
administrative remedies sufficient to deprive the reviewing circuit
aggravated felony conviction and noncitizens charged with removability for an aggravated
felony conviction who have not been lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent
residence); see also infra Part II.B.2.
11 See 8 U.S.C. § 1228 (2018) (providing for the expedited removal of noncitizens convicted
of committing aggravated felonies).
12 See, e.g., Etienne, 813 F.3d at 141–42 (“[W]e cannot say that DHS’s expedited removal
procedures offer an alien the opportunity to challenge the legal basis of his or her removal.”);
Valdiviez-Hernandez v. Holder, 739 F.3d 184, 187 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that the noncitizen
did not fail to exhaust administrative remedies because the expedited removal proceeding
“did not provide [him] with an avenue to challenge the legal conclusion that he does not meet
the definition of an alien subject to expedited removal”); cf. Aguilar-Aguilar v. Napolitano,
700 F.3d 1238, 1243 n.5 (10th Cir. 2012) (declining to adopt a broad reading of “administrative
remedy” and noting that “[a]n administrative remedy in the removal context denotes a means
by which an alien . . . may seek redress from an adverse agency decision”).
13 See, e.g., Valdiviez-Hernandez, 739 F.3d at 187 (“The relevant statutes and
corresponding regulations therefore did not provide [the noncitizen] with an avenue to
challenge the legal conclusion that he does not meet the definition of an alien subject to
expedited removal. As such, [he] did not fail to exhaust his administrative remedies.”).
14 See, e.g., Malu v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 764 F.3d 1282, 1289 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding that the
noncitizen “could have but failed to exhaust the argument that she was not an aggravated
felon”); Escoto-Castillo v. Napolitano, 658 F.3d 864, 866 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding that the
noncitizen’s “failure to raise [an] alleged error of law to the agency preclude[d] [the court’s]
review of the issue”).
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court of jurisdiction to consider that legal challenge when raised on
appeal.15
Federal circuit courts thus disagree on whether a noncitizen has
effectively exhausted their administrative remedies when they do
not raise a legal challenge to their removal during an expedited
removal proceeding but do so on appeal before a circuit court. What
is missing from this analysis, however, is consideration of the proper
scope of the administrative-exhaustion requirement as a
prerequisite to judicial review of expedited removal orders. A
variation on the traditional requirement of exhausting
administrative remedies is the requirement of exhausting issues.16
By requiring noncitizens to raise legal challenges to their removal
during expedited removal proceedings, circuit courts impose an
issue
exhaustion
requirement—above
and
beyond
the
administrative remedy exhaustion requirement—that is not present
in the judicial review statute.17
This Note argues that circuits requiring issue exhaustion impose
an unjustified barrier to judicial review. Part II provides an
overview of immigration legislation in the United States, expedited
removal proceedings, and the judicial review process for expedited
removal orders. Part II also assesses the circuit split on exhaustion
of administrative remedies and evaluates this case law in terms of
issue exhaustion. Part III discusses the difference between
exhausting administrative remedies and exhausting issues and
presents the U.S. Supreme Court’s framework for issue exhaustion,
Sims v. Apfel. Part IV applies the Sims approach to expedited
removal cases, assesses the circuit courts’ rationales for issue
exhaustion, and considers the proper role of the judiciary in
imposing such a requirement absent a statutory mandate. Part V
concludes.

15 See, e.g., Malu, 764 F.3d at 1288 (noting that a noncitizen “must exhaust all
administrative remedies by rebutting the charges—including the conclusion of law that [they
are] an aggravated felon—before the Department [of Homeland Security]”).
16 To exhaust administrative remedies, “a petitioner [must] ask an administrative agency
for relief before filing [their] action in a federal court.” Id. at 1287 (citing Sims v. Apfel, 530
U.S. 103, 107 (2000)). To exhaust issues, “a petitioner [must] raise specific issues before the
agency before raising those issues in federal court.” Id. (citing Sims, 530 U.S. at 107).
17 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (2018) (granting jurisdiction for review only if “the [noncitizen]
has exhausted all administrative remedies available to [them] as of right” (emphasis added)).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES

The cornerstone of immigration law in the United States is the
Immigration and Nationality Act.18 Although nearly seventy years
old, the INA “remains the centerpiece of United States immigration
law, providing the modern statutory framework for controlling the
exclusion, admission[,] and removal of non-citizens.”19 With the
enactment of the INA, “declaratory and injunctive relief replaced
habeas corpus as the principal vehicle for obtaining judicial review
of a deportation decision.”20 Amendments to the INA in 1961
allowed noncitizens to seek judicial review of removal orders either
by petitioning a federal court of appeals or by seeking habeas corpus
in a federal district court, depending on the nature of the
proceeding.21 This scheme for judicial review lasted until 1996,
when Congress passed both the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (the IIRIRA)22 and the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (the AEDPA),23 which “together
significantly altered the jurisdictional scheme for federal review of
immigration orders.”24
The AEDPA yielded two significant consequences for judicial
review of immigration orders. First, it eliminated the provision of
the INA that allowed noncitizens in certain proceedings to seek
habeas corpus relief.25 Second, it limited circuit courts’ ability to
Id. §§ 1101–1537.
Sara A. Rodriguez, Note, Exile and the Not-So-Lawful Permanent Resident: Does
International Law Require a Humanitarian Waiver of Deportation for the Non-Citizen
Convicted of Certain Crimes?, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 483, 488 (2006).
20 Legomsky, supra note 5, at 1623.
21 See Rebecca Sharpless, Fitting the Formula for Judicial Review: The Law-Fact
Distinction in Immigration Law, 5 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 57, 62 (2010)
(“Congress amended the INA to include a judicial review provision that made . . . exclusion
orders reviewable by habeas petition in the district courts.”).
22 Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
& 18 U.S.C.).
23 Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22,
28, & 34 U.S.C.).
24 14A ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3664 (4th ed. 2019),
Westlaw FPP.
25 Id.
18
19
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exercise “direct review jurisdiction” over final removal orders for
noncitizens facing removal on criminal grounds.26 These changes
deprived noncitizens facing removal due to criminal convictions of
the right to judicial review.27
The IIRIRA took these limitations on judicial review one step
further by “expand[ing] the bar on review of criminal orders of
removal and add[ing] additional jurisdictional bars.”28 Further, “one
of Congress’s principal goals in enacting [the] IIRIRA was to
expedite the removal of [noncitizens] who have been convicted of
aggravated felonies.”29 In 2005, the REAL ID Act loosened the
stringent limitations on judicial review of final removal orders
issued to certain classes of noncitizens.30 The REAL ID Act
“amended the INA to insert a savings clause permitting most
noncitizens with otherwise barred claims to obtain direct appellate
court review of ‘constitutional claims or questions of law.’”31 Under
this provision, noncitizens previously precluded from seeking
judicial review of final orders of removal could now do so, provided
that their petition for review raised a constitutional claim or issue
of law.32

Id.
See Sharpless, supra note 21, at 63 (noting that the AEDPA “repealed judicial review for
noncitizens determined to be deportable under most criminal grounds of removal”).
28 Id.; see also John W. Guendelsberger, Judicial Deference to Agency Decisions in Removal
Proceedings in Light of INS v. Ventura, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 605, 616 (2005) (explaining that,
with the IIRIRA’s passage, “Congress limited [circuit] court jurisdiction to review decisions
in removal cases in which the [noncitizen] has committed specified criminal offenses”).
29 Zhang v. INS, 274 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Dara Lind, The Disastrous,
Forgotten 1996 Law that Created Today’s Immigration Problem, VOX (Apr. 28, 2016, 8:40
AM), https://www.vox.com/2016/4/28/11515132/iirira-clinton-immigration (referring to the
IIRIRA as “a bundle of provisions with a single goal: to increase penalties on immigrants who
had violated [U.S.] law in some way (whether they were unauthorized immigrants who’d
violated immigration law or legal immigrants who’d committed other crimes)”).
30 Pub. L. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
31 Sharpless, supra note 21, at 65 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2006)); see also 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(D) (2018) (“Nothing in subparagraph (B) or (C) . . . which limits or eliminates
judicial review, shall be construed as precluding review of constitutional claims or questions
of law raised upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals . . . .”).
32 See Sharpless, supra note 21, at 65 (“The savings clause in the REAL ID Act . . . restor[es]
review over questions otherwise barred from judicial review but only in so far as the questions
are legal rather than factual.”).
26
27
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B. EXPEDITED REMOVAL AND JUDICIAL REVIEW

1. The Expedited Removal Process. The Department of Homeland
Security consists of several government entities responsible for
immigration enforcement, including Customs and Border
Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and United
States Citizenship and Immigration Services.33 DHS administers a
number of programs that “permit the agency to remove or deport a
person from the United States without undertaking the formalized
and exhaustive removal hearing.”34 Some legal scholars have
termed these programs “speed deportation”35 and refer to the
procedures accompanying them as “shadow proceedings,”36
language that reflects both their cursory and often extrajudicial
nature. The rationale supporting these rapid deportations is one of
government efficiency; in fact, DHS appears to rely on speed
removals far more than any other immigration procedure.37
One such program, expedited removal, “applies to noncitizens
who are not permanent residents of the United States and have
been classified by DHS as convicted of an aggravated felony.”38
33 Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Rise of Speed Deportation and the Role of Discretion, 5
COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 5 (2014).
34 Id. at 2.
35 Id. at 6.
36 Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the Shadows of Immigration Court, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 181,
186 (2017).
37 See Wadhia, supra note 33, at 3 (noting that 82.8% of removals in 2013 “were comprised
of expedited removals and reinstatements,” while only 17% of noncitizens who were deported
“were removed following a removal order issued by an immigration judge within the
Executive Office for Immigration Review”); Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Validity, Construction,
and Application of 8 U.S.C.A. § 1228 Governing Expedited Removal of Aliens Convicted of
Committing Aggravated Felonies, 32 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 509, Art. I, § 2 (2020) (noting that the
concept of “aggravated felony” in the administrative removal process “was designed to provide
as few barriers as possible to the removal of dangerous aliens and thereby make the system
run more efficiently”).
38 Wadhia, supra note 33, at 6–7; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1228 (2018). Terminology for different
types of expedited removal programs varies across the literature. For the sake of simplicity,
this Note uses “expedited removal” to refer to a situation in which a noncitizen is placed in
“expedited proceedings” under 8 U.S.C. § 1228(a)(3) (2018). For an example of a different term
used for this program, see Wadhia, supra note 33, at 6 (referring to expedited removal as
“administrative removal”). DHS manages two additional variations of accelerated
deportation programs, but they are beyond the scope of this Note. One applies to individuals
who arrive at the United States border or within one hundred miles of the border without
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Under this process, noncitizens who have been convicted of an
offense that the INA considers to be an “aggravated felony”39 face
expedited removal and are “not entitled to procedural safeguards
such as appeals, judicial discretion, and asylum, which may prolong
or forestall his or her deportation.”40
The INA41 and its accompanying regulations42 provide the
framework for the expedited removal process. Traditionally, when
a noncitizen faces removal for an aggravated felony conviction, they
must “be afforded a hearing before an [Immigration Judge], where
the [noncitizen] may contest the factual or legal basis of [their]
removability.”43 Immigration Judges (IJs) must be attorneys and
are appointed by the Attorney General.44 However, noncitizens who
have not been admitted lawfully to the United States face a different
outcome when charged with removability on the grounds of an
aggravated felony conviction: “the INA authorizes an expedited
removal process, without a hearing before an IJ.”45

sufficient documentation or with fraudulent documentation. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2018). The second, known as “reinstatement,” applies to individuals
reentering the United States “without authorization after having departed the United States
voluntarily or under a previous removal order.” Wadhia, supra note 33, at 6; see also 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(5) (2018). See generally Lindsay M. Harris, Withholding Protection, 50 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 13, 13 n.32 (2019) (collecting works by legal scholars and describing
different terminology used to describe the “‘shadow’ deportation system”).
39 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2018) (describing classes of “deportable aliens”). Any noncitizen
falling into the categories outlined in this statutory provision is subject to removal “upon the
order of the Attorney General.” Id. One such category includes noncitizens who have been
convicted of aggravated felonies. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (“Any alien who is convicted of an
aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.”); id. § 1101(a)(43) (defining
“aggravated felony”); cf. Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law:
Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 483 (2007)
(noting that “one concept—the ‘aggravated felony’—has accounted for the steadiest and most
expansive growth in the range of crimes that give rise to removal”).
40 Zitter, supra note 37, Art. I, § 2.
41 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b) (2018).
42 8 C.F.R. § 238.1 (2020).
43 Etienne v. Lynch, 813 F.3d 135, 138–39 (4th Cir. 2015) (first citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229,
1229a; and then citing 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(c)).
44 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (2018) (defining “immigration judge”).
45 Etienne, 813 F.3d at 139; see also Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks
the Right to Judicial Review of Immigration Proceedings, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1411, 1497 Chart
3 (1997) (depicting the expedited removal process).
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Instead of an IJ, a deciding service officer presides over expedited
removal proceedings.46 The officer does not have to be an attorney
and is not appointed by the Attorney General.47 DHS must provide
a noncitizen who meets the statutory requirements of expedited
removal with “reasonable notice of the charges, notice of [their]
right to be represented by counsel at no expense to the government,
the right to inspect, examine and rebut evidence, and service of the
record in person or by mail.”48
Noncitizens facing expedited removal receive a “Notice of Intent
to Issue a Final Administrative Removal Order” (Notice of Intent),
marking the beginning of expedited removal proceedings.49 A
noncitizen may contest removability by providing a written
response to the Notice of Intent “rebutting the allegations
supporting the charge and/or requesting the opportunity to review
the Government’s evidence.”50 The deciding service officer then
determines removability based on this written response.51 If the
noncitizen did not respond within a ten-day period and the evidence
establishes removability to a “clear, convincing, and unequivocal”
degree, then the officer will issue a Final Administrative Removal
Order.52 If the noncitizen’s rebuttal is insufficient or does not raise
a genuine issue of material fact, the deciding service officer may
issue a Final Administrative Removal Order if the evidence
nonetheless establishes a “clear, convincing, and unequivocal” case
for removability.53

46 See 8 C.F.R. § 238.1 (2020) (outlining the process by which a deciding service offer
assesses the removability of a noncitizen in an expedited removal proceeding).
47 See id. § 238.1(a) (omitting such prerequisites in defining “Deciding Service officer”).
48 Wadhia, supra note 33, at 9; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b)(4) (2018) (defining rights provided
to noncitizens who are not lawful permanent residents and subject to expedited removal
proceedings).
49 Wadhia, supra note 33, at 9. The Notice of Intent provides the noncitizen with
information about the following: grounds for their removal; options for seeking legal counsel;
the opportunity to seek withholding of removal based on a fear of persecution or torture in
the country of removal; the right to inspect the evidence supporting the Notice of Intent; and
the opportunity to rebut the charges within ten days after service of the Notice of Intent. 8
C.F.R. § 238.1(b)(2)(i) (2020).
50 8 C.F.R. § 238.1(c)(1) (2020).
51 Id. § 238.1(d).
52 Id. § 238.1(d)(1).
53 Id. § 238.1(d)(2)(i).
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If the rebuttal does raise a genuine issue of material fact, the
deciding service officer can either procure “additional evidence from
any source” or commence full removal proceedings before an IJ.54
Converting expedited removal proceedings to full removal
proceedings relies on the deciding service officer’s finding that the
noncitizen is “not amenable to removal.”55 Significantly, only
“genuine issue[s] of material fact”—not questions of law or legal
challenges—are sufficient to warrant the collection of additional
evidence or the conversion to full immigration proceedings.56
2. Judicial Review of Expedited Removal Orders. Noncitizens in
immigration proceedings before an IJ may appeal Final
Administrative Removal Orders to the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA);57 noncitizens in expedited removal proceedings do
not have that option. They are limited to appealing Final
Administrative Removal Orders directly to a federal circuit court.58
Furthermore, the AEDPA and the IIRIRA severely limit judicial
review of final removal orders issued to noncitizens convicted of
crimes.59 As a general matter, circuit courts do not have jurisdiction
to review final orders of removal issued to noncitizens removable for
having committed a criminal offense, including an aggravated
felony.60 But recall that the REAL ID Act includes a savings clause
for judicial review of “constitutional claims or questions of law.”61
One such question of law that merits judicial review is the
Id. § 238.1(d)(2)(ii)(A).
Id. § 238.1(d)(2)(iii).
56 Id. § 238.1(d)(2)(ii)(A).
57 See id. § 1003.1(b)(3) (describing the appellate jurisdiction of the Board of Immigration
Appeals as encompassing “[d]ecisions of Immigration Judges in removal proceedings”).
58 See 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C)–(D) (2018) (barring courts from exercising “jurisdiction to
review any final order of removal against [a noncitizen] who is removable by reason of having
committed a criminal offense,” but permitting noncitizens to seek “review of constitutional
claims or questions of law” if a petition is “filed with an appropriate court of appeals”).
59 See supra Part II.A.
60 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (2018) (“[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to review any final
order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed a criminal
offense covered in section . . . 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) . . . .”); id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (“Any alien who
is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.”).
61 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2018) (“Nothing in subparagraph (B) or (C) . . . which limits
or eliminates judicial review, shall be construed as precluding review of constitutional claims
or questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of
appeals . . . .”).
54
55
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classification of a noncitizen’s criminal conviction as an “aggravated
felony.”62
Noncitizens seeking review of Final Administrative Removal
Orders are thus limited to seeking review of constitutional claims
or questions of law alone.63 Furthermore, noncitizens must exhaust
all administrative remedies available “as of right” for a circuit court
to exercise jurisdiction over a petition for review.64 For a remedy to
be available “as of right,” an agency must be able to “give
unencumbered consideration to whether relief should be granted.”65
The requirement of exhausting administrative remedies “means
that ‘a party must normally [pursue] all available avenues of
administrative redress before seeking [appellate] court review.’”66
Thus, to obtain judicial review of a Final Administrative Removal
Order, a noncitizen must ground their petition in either a
constitutional claim or a question of law, and they must have

Courts have exercised jurisdiction “to review as a question of law whether a petitioner’s
prior offense qualifies as an aggravated felony.” Flores-Vega v. Barr, 932 F.3d 878, 882 (9th
Cir. 2019); see also Castendet-Lewis v. Sessions, 855 F.3d 253, 260 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding
that, in the context of immigration law, “[w]hether a crime is an aggravated felony is a
question of law that [the court] reviews de novo”); Escoto-Castillo v. Napolitano, 658 F.3d 864,
865 (8th Cir. 2011) (stating that judicial review of a final order of removal includes “whether
the [noncitizen] was in fact convicted of an aggravated felony”). If a noncitizen challenges the
classification of their conviction as an “aggravated felony” on appeal before a circuit court,
the court will compare the elements of the crime in the statute under which the noncitizen
was convicted with the elements as described in the immigration statute. See Jennifer Lee
Koh, The Whole Better than the Sum: A Case for the Categorical Approach to Determining the
Immigration Consequences of Crime, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 260 (2012) (explaining the
process employed by federal courts and administrative agencies to “determine[] the
immigration consequences of a prior conviction”); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2018) (defining
“aggravated felony” under the INA). This method is termed the “categorical approach” and
involves an examination of “the language of the statute of conviction and not the particular
facts underlying an individual’s conviction.” MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, JENNY ROBERTS &
WAYNE A. LOGAN, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY AND
PRACTICE § 2:55, Westlaw COLLATC (database updated Oct. 2018).
63 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2018).
64 Id. § 1252(d)(1) (“A court may review a final order of removal only if . . . the alien has
exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right . . . .”).
65 Sun v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 932, 942 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1)).
66 Larry R. Fleurantin, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies in Immigration Cases:
Finding Jurisdiction to Review Unexhausted Claims the Board of Immigration Appeals
Considers Sua Sponte on the Merits, 34 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 301, 303–04 (2010) (alterations
in original) (quoting Fine, supra note 4, at 8).
62
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exhausted all of their administrative remedies prior to petitioning
the appropriate circuit court.
C. CIRCUIT SPLIT: THE ROLE OF ISSUE EXHAUSTION IN EXPEDITED
REMOVAL CASES

The federal circuit courts have failed to adopt a uniform approach
for what a noncitizen in expedited removal proceedings must do to
sufficiently exhaust their administrative remedies such that a
circuit court will exercise jurisdiction to review a removal order.
This circuit split has serious ramifications. Procedural safeguards
in expedited removal proceedings, and opportunities for judicial
review of their outcomes, are already slim, magnifying any added
barrier to obtaining judicial review.67 The following two cases
illustrate the differing approaches taken by the circuits.
1. Etienne v. Lynch: Declining to Require Issue Exhaustion. In
Etienne v. Lynch, the Fourth Circuit held that noncitizens in
expedited removal proceedings are not required to exhaust all
issues before raising them on appeal before a circuit court.68 In that
case, DHS served Eddy Etienne with a Notice of Intent and
commenced expedited removal proceedings against him on the
grounds of a conviction for conspiracy.69 After receiving a Final
Administrative Removal Order, Etienne filed a petition for review
with the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.70
In that petition, he argued—for the first time—that his
conviction did not constitute an “aggravated felony” and that DHS
incorrectly found him removable.71 He contended that expedited
removal proceedings do not allow noncitizens to raise legal
challenges to their removal, instead only permitting factual
challenges.72 Because of this, Etienne claimed to have “no
67 See, e.g., Koh, supra note 36, at 182–83 (noting that “the procedural protections available
in immigration court strike many as insufficient when compared to the human consequences
at stake with deportation”).
68 Etienne v. Lynch, 813 F.3d 135, 142 (4th Cir. 2015) (holding that the noncitizen “was not
required to raise his legal challenge to removal in order to meet the exhaustion requirement
of . . . 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1)”).
69 Id. at 137.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 138.
72 Id.
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opportunity during administrative removal to challenge the
classification of his . . . conspiracy conviction as an ‘aggravated
felony,’ and therefore he [had] not failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies.”73
The government disagreed. They argued that the relevant
regulations allowed DHS officers to assess noncitizens’ legal
challenges to their removability during expedited removal
proceedings and that these regulations required “the [noncitizen] to
raise any such challenge before DHS or forfeit that claim for failing
to exhaust administrative remedies.”74
The Fourth Circuit agreed with Etienne, finding that expedited
removal proceedings deny noncitizens the opportunity to challenge
the legal basis of removal.75 The court reasoned that “the language
of the expedited removal regulations, read in context with the INA
and associated regulations, seems to indicate that only factual
challenges to [a noncitizen’s] removability may be raised in
expedited removal proceedings.”76 The court also analyzed the
physical Notice of Intent form that DHS provides to noncitizens
facing expedited removal, remarking that the form “offers no
obvious opportunity to raise a legal challenge.”77
Because expedited removal proceedings do not accommodate
legal challenges to removal, the Fourth Circuit concluded that
Etienne had not failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and
that it had jurisdiction to consider his challenge to the legal grounds
of his removal.78
2. Malu v. U.S. Attorney General: Requiring Issue Exhaustion.
Malu v. U.S. Attorney General factually resembles Etienne, but the
court concluded differently on the question of administrative

Id.
Id. at 140.
75 Id. at 141.
76 Id. The court further reasoned that “[t]he procedures that are explicitly available to the
deciding DHS officer after an alien responds to the Notice of Intent contemplate a ‘genuine
issue of material fact’ that the officer may attempt to cure by gathering additional evidence.”
Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 238.1(d)(2)).
77 Id. at 141.
78 Id. at 142. The court went on to consider the merits of Etienne’s appeal and ultimately
affirmed the removal order because his conviction for conspiracy constituted an “aggravated
felony” within the meaning of the INA. Id. at 145.
73
74
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exhaustion.79 Biuma Claudine Malu was charged with simple
battery in 2011.80 DHS classified that crime as an aggravated felony
and initiated expedited removal proceedings after issuing Malu a
Notice of Intent.81
Before the Eleventh Circuit, Malu argued, for the first time, that
the basis for the expedited removal proceedings against her was
without merit because simple battery should not be classified as an
“aggravated felony” under the INA.82 In response, the government
contended that by failing to raise the grounds of her removability
during administrative proceedings, Malu failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies regarding that issue and was subsequently
barred from raising it on appeal.83
Malu contended that she was obliged only to move through each
phase of administrative proceedings—not to “exhaust specific
issues” during those proceedings—in order to exhaust her
administrative remedies as required by the INA.84 Malu relied on
Sims v. Apfel,85 in which the U.S. Supreme Court declined to impose
an issue-exhaustion requirement in Social Security proceedings.86
Yet the Eleventh Circuit summarily dismissed Malu’s argument:
“Sims does not help Malu.”87 The court held that Malu failed to
exhaust her administrative remedies “because she failed to contest
the only ground for her expedited removal: whether her prior
conviction for simple battery was an aggravated felony.”88 The
Eleventh Circuit remarked that in expedited removal proceedings,
“it would be nonsensical to limit the alien’s rebuttal to allegations
of fact, but save for later any rebuttal to conclusions of law.”89
Unlike the Fourth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit held that
79 Malu v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 764 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2014) (denying the noncitizen’s
petition for review because she “failed to exhaust her argument that she did not commit an
aggravated felony”).
80 Id. at 1285.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 1287.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 530 U.S. 103, 107–08 (2000).
86 Malu, 764 F.3d at 1287.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 1287–88.
89 Id. at 1288.
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noncitizens can—and indeed, must—exhaust all issues, including
those of a legal nature, during expedited removal proceedings before
raising them on appeal.90

III. ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY EXHAUSTION AND ISSUE
EXHAUSTION
A. CONCEPTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE EXHAUSTION

The role of administrative agencies within the three-branch
system of government “requires that the judiciary tolerate a certain
amount of agency discretion by giving considerable deference to
agency action.”91 Agency actions are presumptively subject to
review by the courts, but this “considerable deference” to agencies
has placed limits on judicial review of their actions.92 First, courts
may only review final agency actions.93 To be “final,” an agency
action generally must “have some direct, binding, and immediate
impact on the parties.”94 Second, courts may only review agency
actions when a party has exhausted all options for redress offered
by the agency—a requirement known as the “doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies.”95
Exhausting administrative remedies “generally requires a party
to go through all the stages of an administrative adjudication before
going to court.”96 Obliging a party to complete all phases of an
Id. at 1289.
Fine, supra note 4, at 2; see also 4 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR. & RICHARD MURPHY,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 12:21 (3d ed. 2019), Westlaw ADMLP (“Exhaustion
doctrine ‘serves the twin purposes of protecting administrative agency authority and
promoting judicial efficiency.’” (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992),
superseded by statute, Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat.
1321-66, as recognized in Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84–85 (2006))).
92 Fine, supra note 4, at 3 (“[T]here is a general presumption of court reviewability of agency
action. The right to judicial review of final actions of administrative agencies is wellestablished, both at common law and as a matter of statutory right.”).
93 Id. at 7 (“As a general matter, only agency action that is ‘final’ is reviewable.” (quoting 5
U.S.C. § 704 (1994)); see also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2018) (limiting
judicial review to “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court”).
94 Fine, supra note 4, at 7.
95 Id. at 8.
96 Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Fail to Comment at Your Own Risk: Does Issue Exhaustion Have a
Place in Judicial Review of Rules?, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 111 (2018).
90
91
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administrative process promotes finality by “ensur[ing] that the
agency action being challenged is the final agency position.”97
Requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies also allows the
agency to exercise its specialized expertise in the resolution of the
matter and relieves burdens on the judicial system by preemptively
settling disputes that do not require court intervention.98
A “new permutation” of the traditional doctrine of administrative
remedy exhaustion involves “situations where a petitioner for
judicial review did follow all the steps of the administrative appeals
process, but . . . failed to raise in that process the issues now sought
to be litigated in court.”99 This “permutation,” a requirement of
administrative “issue exhaustion,” obliges a party to exhaust all
possible issues before an administrative agency prior to raising
those issues before a court on judicial review.100 Courts generally
will not address an issue on judicial review that was not raised by
the party before the agency during administrative proceedings.101

Id.
See id. (explaining further the benefits of “remedy exhaustion” for both the agency and
the courts).
99 Id.; see also 4 KOCH & MURPHY, supra note 91, § 12:21 (“[Issue exhaustion] blocks a party
from litigating a particular issue on judicial review of agency action unless that issue was
raised before the agency.”).
100 See William Funk, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies – New Dimensions Since
Darby, 18 PACE ENV’T L. REV. 1, 11 (2000) (“‘Issue exhaustion’ is a term that refers to the
need to raise an issue with an administrative agency before raising it on judicial review.”).
While this Note uses the term “issue exhaustion,” other terms are used interchangeably to
refer to this doctrine as well. See 33 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 8364 (2d ed. 2020), Westlaw FPP (noting that courts also refer
to this doctrine as “issue waiver” or “administrative waiver”).
101 See Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 373 F.3d 1251, 1297 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (“It is a hard and fast rule of administrative law, rooted in simple fairness, that issues
not raised before an agency are waived and will not be considered by a court on review.”).
This rule has exceptions, though: “Courts have excused a requirement of issue exhaustion
where ‘issues by their very nature could not have been raised before the agency,’” or where
raising the issue would have been futile. 33 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 100, § 8364
(quoting Petroleum Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 22 F.3d 1164, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
97
98

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol55/iss2/7

18

Snow: Judicial Review in Expedited Removal Proceedings: Applying Sims v

2021]

EXPEDITED REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS

865

B. SIMS V. APFEL FRAMEWORK FOR JUDICIALLY IMPOSING ISSUE
EXHAUSTION

In Sims v. Apfel, the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed the propriety
of a judicially imposed issue-exhaustion requirement in a petition
for appeal arising from a claim for Social Security benefits.102 In that
case, the relevant statutes and regulations governing the
petitioner’s request for review did not require issue exhaustion.103
Writing for the majority, Justice Clarence Thomas noted that courts
occasionally require issue exhaustion even without a statutory
mandate: “The basis for a judicially imposed issue-exhaustion
requirement is an analogy to the rule that appellate courts will not
consider arguments not raised before trial courts.”104
The Court observed that “[w]here the parties are expected to
develop the issues in an adversarial administrative proceeding, it
seems . . . that the rationale for requiring issue exhaustion is at its
greatest.”105 Proceedings under the Social Security Act (SSA) rely
on an “investigatory model” of decisionmaking, rather than a
judicial model based on an adversarial procedure.106 In an SSA
proceeding, an administrative law judge “investigate[s] the facts
Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 107 (2000).
Id. at 108 (“[Social Security Act] regulations do not require issue exhaustion.”). The
Court noted that issue-exhaustion requirements “are largely creatures of statute.” Id. at 107;
see also Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 121 (2d Cir. 2006) (providing examples
of statutes with express issue-exhaustion requirements). When codified in a statute, a
“requirement of issue exhaustion may be jurisdictional, in which case it is not waivable by
the government.” 33 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 100, § 8364. An issue-exhaustion
requirement may be merely “mandatory” when it “amounts to a claims-processing rule.” Id.
The government may waive a mandatory, but not a jurisdictional, issue-exhaustion
requirement. See 33 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 100, § 8316 (“Any statutory scheme that
creates a path for judicial review will contain various grants and limits on the availability of
such review. Courts and litigants must determine which of these provisions are jurisdictional
and which are not. This distinction is important because non-jurisdictional provisions may be
subject to waiver . . . .”).
104 Sims, 530 U.S. at 108–09; see also 4 KOCH & MURPHY, supra note 91, § 12.22 (“In the
absence of statutory or regulatory controls, courts, too, impose issue exhaustion requirements
as a prudential matter.”).
105 Sims, 530 U.S. at 110.
106 Id. (plurality opinion) (“The most important of [the SSA’s modifications of the judicial
model] is the replacement of normal adversary procedure by . . . the ‘investigatory model.’”
(alterations in original) (quoting BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 470 (4th ed.
1994))).
102
103
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and develop[s] the arguments both for and against granting
benefits.”107 The Social Security Appeals Council determines
whether to review a case by reference to a form completed by
petitioners; the form is short, providing only three lines to explain
the request for review, and is accompanied by a notice that it should
take about ten minutes to complete.108
The Court did not impose an issue exhaustion requirement in
Sims.109 In a portion of the opinion with only a plurality of votes,
Justice Thomas observed that—given the inquisitorial nature of
SSA proceedings—“the general rule [of issue exhaustion] makes
little sense in this particular context.”110 Sims thus emphasized the
nature of administrative proceedings—i.e., as inquisitorial or
adversarial—in determining the appropriateness of judicially
imposed issue-exhaustion requirements in the absence of a
statutory jurisdictional requirement.

IV. ISSUE EXHAUSTION IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL CASES
The express language of the IIRIRA does not require issue
exhaustion.111 Noncitizens are required only to “exhaust[] all
administrative remedies available to [them] as of right” before
petitioning a court of appeals for judicial review.112 Courts have
confronted the question of whether the administrative-exhaustion
requirement in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d) encompasses issue exhaustion
Id. at 111.
See id. at 112 (providing a description of Social Security Appeals Council proceedings
and concluding that the brief nature of the form “strongly suggests that the Council does not
depend much, if at all, on claimants to identify issues for review”).
109 Id.
(“[W]e hold that a judicially created issue-exhaustion requirement is
inappropriate.”).
110 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Harwood v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 1039, 1042 (8th Cir.
1999)).
111 See, e.g., Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 120 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he language
of § 1252(d)(1) . . . does not expressly proscribe judicial review of issues not raised in the
course of exhausting all administrative remedies.”); Etchu-Njang v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 577,
582 (8th Cir. 2005) (acknowledging that “the plain language of § 1252(d)(1) could be read to
require only exhaustion of remedies available as of right” rather than both remedies and
issues). However, the court in Etchu-Njang concluded that there were “good reasons to
require” issue exhaustion on other grounds. Id. at 583.
112 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d) (2018) (outlining the exhaustion requirement for expedited removal
proceedings).
107
108
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when a noncitizen fails to raise an issue during expedited removal
proceedings but proceeds to do so on appeal before a federal circuit
court. Those courts, however, have failed to reach a consensus.113
Specifically, those courts have disagreed on whether a failure to
contest the classification of a conviction as an aggravated felony
during the administrative phase of expedited removal proceedings
constitutes a failure to exhaust administrative remedies.114
Interestingly, these cases rarely refer to “issue exhaustion” when
considering whether this failure precludes the issue from
consideration on judicial review.115 One court noted that “[t]he
opportunity to raise a legal challenge”—such as the proper
classification of a prior conviction—could be considered “one of the
‘steps that the agency holds out’ and therefore an administrative
remedy that must be exhausted.”116 Other courts have held,
however, that “[w]hether a crime is an aggravated felony is a
question of law that [they] review de novo” on appeal.117 That circuit
courts routinely consider the classification of a conviction as a
113 See supra notes 12–15 and accompanying text. Courts have considered whether this
same administrative-exhaustion requirement encompasses an obligation to exhaust issues in
full immigration proceedings, i.e., when a noncitizen fails to raise an issue in a hearing before
the BIA but proceeds to do so on appeal before a circuit court. See, e.g., Alvarado v. Holder,
759 F.3d 1121, 1127 n.5 (9th Cir. 2014) (“We note that some circuits have held that issue
exhaustion, as opposed to exhaustion of administrative remedies, is not a statutory
jurisdictional requirement, but a judicially created case processing rule, allowing courts the
‘discretion’ to ‘choose to review [petitioners’] arguments not previously made to the BIA.’”
(alteration in original) (quoting Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 118–22 (2d Cir.
2006))).
114 See supra Part II.C.
115 See, e.g., Etienne v. Lynch, 813 F.3d 135, 142 (4th Cir. 2015) (noting that the petitioner
“was not required to raise his legal challenge to removal in order to meet the exhaustion
requirement of . . . 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1)” (emphasis added)); Valdiviez-Hernandez v. Holder,
739 F.3d 184, 187 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that the petitioner “did not fail to exhaust his
administrative remedies” (emphasis added)). But cf. Malu v. U.S. Gen., 764 F.3d 1282, 1287–
89 (11th Cir. 2014) (addressing Sims v. Apfel and its framework for issue exhaustion, but
ultimately framing its holding in terms of the noncitizen’s failure to exhaust administrative
remedies rather than issues); Escoto-Castillo v. Napolitano, 658 F.3d 864, 866 (8th Cir. 2011)
(holding “that failure to exhaust administrative immigration remedies precludes merits
review of the unexhausted issue”).
116 Etienne, 813 F.3d at 142 (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006), superseded
by statute, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), as recognized in William Loveland Coll.
v. Distance Educ. Accreditation Comm’n, 347 F. Supp. 3d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2018)).
117 Castendet-Lewis v. Sessions, 855 F.3d 253, 260 (4th Cir. 2017).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2020

21

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 55, No. 2 [2020], Art. 7

868

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:847

question of law—rather than a remedy that could have been
pursued during administrative proceedings—militates in favor of
analyzing these cases as concerning issue-exhaustion, rather than
remedy-exhaustion, requirements.
This section will consider the appropriateness of judicially
imposing an issue-exhaustion requirement in expedited removal
cases. First, it will assess expedited removal proceedings in the
Sims v. Apfel framework. Second, it will examine the differing
approaches of the circuits as exemplified in Etienne and Malu.
Finally, this section recommends judicial deference in the matter of
imposing issue exhaustion in appeals of expedited removal orders.
A. APPLYING SIMS V. APFEL

Immigration proceedings typically have the adversarial
characteristics
that
would
make
“an
issue-exhaustion
requirement . . . ‘an important corollary’ of any requirement of
exhaustion of remedies.”118 Noncitizens facing removal for an
aggravated felony conviction in both full removal proceedings119 and
expedited removal proceedings receive notice of the commencement
of such proceedings.120 Standards of evidence and burdens of proof
in immigration proceedings “bear a strong resemblance to [those
used in] judicial trials.”121 Noncitizens facing removal may “defend
against removability” and seek several remedies.122
118 Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 121 (2d Cir. 2006), amended by 480 F.3d
104 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 107 (2000)).
119 “Full removal proceedings” refers to non-expedited removal proceedings in which a
noncitizen is afforded a hearing before an IJ and is entitled to appeal the IJ’s determination
before the BIA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2018) (outlining the requirements of removal
proceedings). Part IV compares full immigration proceedings and expedited removal
proceedings but does not consider the applicability of issue exhaustion to appeals from full
immigration proceedings.
120 See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 698 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Consistent with
the adversarial nature of judicial proceedings, a deportation proceeding is commenced with a
‘Notice to Appear,’ . . . a charging document or complaint-like pleading, which vests
jurisdiction with the immigration court. . . . This document must . . . put the non-citizen on
notice of the charges against him.” (citations omitted)). A “Notice to Appear” is analogous to
a “Notice of Intent.” See 8 C.F.R. § 238.1(b)(2)(i) (2020) (stating that a Notice of Intent shall
“constitute the charging document” and “include allegations of fact and conclusions of law”).
121 Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 698.
122 Id.
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Yet fundamental differences exist between full immigration
proceedings and expedited removal proceedings.123 Noncitizens in
full immigration proceedings are entitled to contest their
removability in the first instance before an IJ, who is required to be
a lawyer.124 In Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, the Sixth Circuit
analogized judicial trials and immigration proceedings, and
included in its comparison that “[r]emoval proceedings are presided
over by immigration judges.”125 The regulations governing hearings
before an IJ expressly contemplate the resolution of legal
questions.126
Compare this process to the proceedings accompanying expedited
removal. Those proceedings are conducted by a deciding service
officer, who need not be a lawyer.127 In Valdiviez-Hernandez v.
Holder, the Fifth Circuit noted that noncitizens “do not appear
before an IJ, nor can they appeal an adverse decision to the BIA,”
which inhibits noncitizens’ ability to raise legal challenges to their
removability during expedited removal proceedings.128 The
regulations governing expedited removal proceedings make no
mention of “issues of law.”129 In response to an insufficient rebuttal
from a noncitizen or a genuine issue of material fact, a deciding
service officer may gather additional evidence from any source.130
This “investigative” duty recalls the inquisitorial model of
123 See DANIEL KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH 65 (2012) (“[Expedited removal] authorizes
administrative immigration officials to completely avoid formal immigration court
proceedings and to simply order people deported due to the conviction of an ‘aggravated
felony.’ . . . Individuals are simply notified of the charges and are given ten days in which to
respond to a DHS deportation and removal officer. Procedural safeguards are rather
minimal.” (footnote omitted)).
124 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (2018) (defining “immigration judge”).
125 Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 699.
126 See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(c) (2020) (“If the respondent admits the factual allegations and
admits his or her removability under the charges and the immigration judge is satisfied that
no issues of law or fact remain, the immigration judge may determine that removability as
charged has been established by the admissions of the respondent.” (emphasis added)).
127 Id. § 238.1(a) (2020) (defining “Deciding Service officer”); cf. Valdiviez-Hernandez v.
Holder, 739 F.3d 184, 187 (5th Cir. 2013) (“[The petitioner] further argues that DHS officers
are not trained to interpret immigration statutes to the extent of an IJ or the Board of
Immigration Appeals . . . .”).
128 Valdiviez-Hernandez, 739 F.3d at 187.
129 See generally 8 C.F.R. § 238.1 (2020).
130 Id. § 238.1 (d)(2)(ii)(A).
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decisionmaking that characterized Social Security proceedings in
Sims and led the Court to not require issue exhaustion.131
Expedited removal proceedings are neither non-adversarial nor
inquisitorial in nature. But a comparison of the characteristics of
expedited removal with those of full immigration proceedings
suggests that the former gravitates toward factfinding, rather than
the resolution of legal and factual issues, while the latter are
equipped to do both. Expedited removal proceedings are more
properly characterized as quasi-adversarial, and this nuance is
significant. The U.S. Supreme Court has explained that “the
desirability of a court imposing a requirement of issue exhaustion
depends on the degree to which the analogy to normal adversarial
litigation applies in a particular administrative proceeding.”132 In
expedited removal proceedings, that analogy does not stretch far
enough. Because expedited removal proceedings bear little
resemblance to judicial trials—with their robust procedural
protections and capacity to resolve factual and legal issues—courts
should exercise caution before imposing an issue-exhaustion
requirement when reviewing petitions for review from expedited
removal cases.
B. ACCOMMODATING LEGAL CHALLENGES

An additional reason that circuit courts should not impose an
issue-exhaustion requirement is that the expedited removal process
essentially excludes consideration of questions of law. One question
of law that a noncitizen facing expedited removal can raise on a
petition for review is the classification of their conviction as an
“aggravated felony.”133 Since the term’s introduction into
immigration law in the late 1980s, an “aggravated felony” has
shifted from a narrowly tailored concept to a broad, ever-growing
“colossus.”134 Legislative amendments enacted in the 1990s and
2000s so broadened the contours of an “aggravated felony” that it

Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 110–11 (2000) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 109 (majority opinion).
133 See supra note 62.
134 See Legomsky, supra note 39, at 483–84 (discussing the “stead[y]” and “expansive
growth” of the term “aggravated felony”).
131
132
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“need no longer be either aggravated or a felony.”135 The term’s
expanding reach and “the severe consequences that follow the
labeling of a crime as an aggravated felony” render all the more
critical the opportunity to raise a legal challenge—particularly to
the classification of a conviction—on judicial review.136
In cases where a noncitizen did not challenge the classification of
a conviction during expedited removal proceedings, subsequent
circuit courts have considered whether those noncitizens failed to
exhaust their administrative remedies by failing to exhaust that
issue before raising it on appeal. In Etienne, the Fourth Circuit
emphasized that expedited removal proceedings do not
accommodate legal challenges.137 The Notice of Intent that initiates
those proceedings supports this conclusion. A noncitizen may
respond to the Notice of Intent by checking one of four boxes to
contest her deportation.138 Only one box, which permits the
noncitizen to attach documents supporting the contested removal,
could possibly accommodate a challenge to the classification of an
aggravated felony.139
Per the Eleventh Circuit, limiting a noncitizen’s response to the
Notice of Intent to factual issues alone would be “nonsensical.”140
Yet, nonsensical or not, that is precisely the limitation imposed by
the Notice of Intent. The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the
government’s observation that “the regulations make clear that the
charges in the notice of intent include both ‘allegations of fact and
conclusions of law’ that the alien may rebut.”141 That the Notice of
Intent must “include allegations of fact and conclusions of law” is a
far cry from an administrative procedure that affords sufficient
opportunity to a noncitizen to present a legal challenge.142 The
Fourth Circuit and others similarly aligned present significantly
Id. at 484–85.
Id. at 485–86.
137 Etienne v. Lynch, 813 F.3d 135, 141–42 (4th Cir. 2015) (“[W]e cannot say that DHS’s
expedited removal procedures offer an alien the opportunity to challenge the legal basis of his
or her removal.”).
138 Id. at 139.
139 Id. (showing a form with a checkbox stating that the noncitizen is “attaching documents
in support of [their] rebuttal and request for further review”).
140 Malu v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 764 F.3d 1282, 1288 (11th Cir. 2014).
141 Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 238.1(b)(2)(i)).
142 8 C.F.R. § 238.1(b)(2)(i) (2020).
135
136
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more persuasive interpretations of the expedited removal process
and its requirements—or lack thereof—with regard to
administrative exhaustion.
C. SITUATING ISSUE-EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENTS

When expedited removal orders are appealed to circuit courts,
judicial deference—i.e., refusing to require that noncitizens exhaust
issues in the absence of a statutory mandate—is the proper
approach; this is evidenced by the fact that solutions to the issueexhaustion conundrum are unlikely to emanate from the judiciary.
In Etienne, for example, the Fourth Circuit noted that its opinion
does not preclude “DHS from changing [the form accompanying the
Notice of Intent] to make it clear that DHS wishes to require aliens
to raise legal arguments in expedited removal proceedings.”143
Resolving the proper scope of the issue-exhaustion requirement is a
project for the legislature. The legislation governing expedited
removal makes no mention of issue exhaustion.144 Courts responded
to this silence by requiring noncitizens to contest the legal grounds
of their removal in proceedings that are fundamentally ill-suited to
accommodate legal challenges.145 An ideal solution would be
legislative action to change the nature of expedited removal
proceedings to better accommodate legal challenges by noncitizens.
In the absence of such action, courts should refrain from
constructing additional barriers to judicial review of an expedited
removal order.

Etienne, 813 F.3d at 142.
See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
145 Compare Malu, 764 F.3d at 1288 (imposing an issue-exhaustion requirement because
“the regulations make clear that the charges in the notice of intent include both ‘allegations
of fact and conclusions of law’ that the alien may rebut” (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 238.1(b)(2)(i))),
and Escoto-Castillo v. Napolitano, 658 F.3d 864, 866 (8th Cir. 2011) (“We have repeatedly
held that failure to exhaust administrative immigration remedies precludes merits review of
the unexhausted issue.”), with Etienne, 813 F.3d at 141–42 (declining to impose an issue
exhaustion requirement because the court “[could not] say that DHS’s expedited removal
procedures offer an alien the opportunity to challenge the legal basis of his or her removal”),
and Valdiviez-Hernandez v. Holder, 739 F.3d 184, 187 (5th Cir. 2013) (finding an issueexhaustion requirement inappropriate because “[t]he relevant statutes and corresponding
regulations . . . did not provide Valdiviez with an avenue” to raise a legal challenge).
143
144
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The question of issue exhaustion in expedited removal cases may
eventually be posed to the U.S. Supreme Court.146 Should that
occur, the Court will likely consider the role of judicial deference in
its reasoning. Those considerations, along with an analysis of
expedited removal proceedings under Sims and an assessment of
the circuit courts’ rationales, should weigh in favor of eliminating
an issue-exhaustion requirement as a prerequisite to judicial review
of removal orders in expedited removal cases.

V. CONCLUSION
Throughout the past several decades, immigration legislation in
the United States has increasingly narrowed the scope of judicial
review over removal proceedings.147 In light of this trend, the few
spaces that remain open to noncitizens for seeking judicial review
of removal orders are important to preserve. Noncitizens confronted
with final orders of removal following expedited removal
proceedings face an uphill battle in challenging the factual or legal
grounds of their removal in court. The hurdles that these
noncitizens face as they pursue judicial review vary by circuit. Some
require a noncitizen to exhaust all issues, including the legal
grounds of their removal, during expedited removal proceedings.
Other circuits do not, on the grounds that doing so is not even
possible. In Sims v. Apfel, the U.S. Supreme Court provided a
framework for analyzing whether judicially imposed issue
exhaustion is an appropriate requirement.148 As quasi-adversarial
proceedings, expedited removal proceedings fall into a gray area

146 See, e.g., Quinteros v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 945 F.3d 772, 781 n.23 (3d Cir. 2019)
(declining to “wade into this circuit split” because the agency considered the noncitizen’s legal
challenge sua sponte). The U.S. Supreme Court, however, may inevitably have to “wade into
this circuit split.” Id.
147 Cf. 14A MILLER, supra note 24, § 3664 (“Since the 1990s, the judicial review of
immigration orders has been a source of significant political and legal controversy.”). As
recently as 2020, the Court upheld the judicial review provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2), which
“limits the review that an alien in expedited removal may obtain via a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus.” See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1966, 1983
(2020) (holding that “§ 1252(e)(2) does not violate due process”). That particular judicial
review provision is not at issue in this Note, but the Court’s recent ruling further evinces the
shrinking space for judicial review of removal orders.
148 530 U.S. 103, 110 (2000).
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under that framework. The accelerated nature of these proceedings,
the lack of procedural protections for the individuals facing removal,
and the vulnerability of those individuals militate in favor of
eliminating, rather than expanding, the administrative-exhaustion
requirement.
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